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The NHS is in what appears to be an endless financial crisis. But why has the government been unable to address
the problem? Geoff Meeks draws parallels between a model deployed by the banking industry and the way the
NHS is financed to explain why the problem may ultimately be a political one.
In a 2013 report, Lawrence Tomlinson, then Entrepreneur in Residence at the Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, outlined a model deployed by the banking industry to “artificially distress an otherwise viable business
and through their actions put them on a journey towards administration, receivership and liquidation”. The model,
identified (and castigated) by Tomlinson, is ingenious. And in its main thrust, though not in its details, its analysis of
the relationship between a major stakeholder and its clients finds powerful echoes in the financial relationship
between the government and the NHS.
In Tomlinson’s model, the process might begin with a bank’s client committing a technical breach of a loan
agreement which has “no bearing on the performance or viability of the business”. Then a series of responses by the
bank could tip the client into financial distress.
The first response might include classifying the client as distressed, which would make it very hard for the client to
switch to an alternative bank. Then a fee was sometimes charged to continue with current lending, and the interest
rate increased. With these and other extra costs, a previously viable business could become insolvent. And the
process might culminate in liquidation of the borrower – a process which often realises much lower “fire sale” prices
for assets than an orderly disposal.
Like the distressed commercial borrower in the Tomlinson model, the English hospitals are largely tied to a single
funder – the government. Most have seen their finances sharply deteriorate in recent years. Just four years ago,
only 25 of the 245 hospital trusts were in deficit. In 2016, 156 were in deficit.
Two main triggers helped precipitate this financial decline. First, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report that
central government cuts meant that spending on social care provision by local authorities was reduced by 10 per
cent in real terms between 2010 and 2015, while demand for such care was increasing. Hospitals were unable to
discharge patients whose hospital treatment was complete. The government watchdog, the National Audit Office
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(NAO), reported that towards 3 million hospital bed days per year have been lost on this account. The distressing
consequences for patients awaiting treatment have been well publicized. But the blockage also deprived hospitals of
the substantial income (approaching a billion pounds, according to the NAO) which could have been earned if those
beds had been used to treat patients.
A second trigger was the programme of cuts, or “efficiency savings” demanded by NHS Improvement. NHS Monitor
report that efficiency savings had been running at 1.5 per cent a year in recent years. Recently, NHS Improvement
demanded 4 per cent. The (cross-party) PAC argue that such targets were “unrealistic” and were causing “long-term
damage to trusts’ finances”, while NHS England calculate that 2 per cent is a “more reasonable requirement”. If
hospitals fail to achieve their target cuts, they are to be punished – funding is to be withheld; they will have to borrow
to fill the gap; the additional interest on the new borrowing will add to the financial pressures in future years.
In many circumstances, improving efficiency requires investment. Dr Sarah Wollaston, Chair of the Commons
Health Committee wrote that “many NHS facilities [are] already struggling to cope with the existing demand in
buildings designed for much smaller numbers and different options for treatment…[and] transformation of services
…will require investment of adequate capital resources … [this needs to be] made now if the necessary long-term
savings are to be made”. But, she reported, “capital allocation for health [is] already declining in real terms…[and]
has been repeatedly raided to fund revenue overspends”. Twenty per cent of the capital budget was being diverted
to day-to-day spending, reported the NAO in November 2016.
Where hospital capital spending is funded by the Government through public dividend capital, they are charged an
interest rate of 3.5 per cent. The government is meanwhile borrowing funds at 1 per cent; and lending to banks at
little more than one quarter of 1 per cent. Investment in human capital has also been squeezed. Nurses’ pay has
been reduced by up to 10 per cent in real terms, according to the Royal College of Nursing. The PAC report that
there has been a substantial rise in resignations; but funding for training has been cut. At the same time, caps have
been imposed on the use of more expensive agency staff.
What options are open to a hospital which is financially distressed? A commercial business might try to raise prices,
to close unprofitable activities, to reduce service levels, or to increase the utilization of its physical and human
capital. An NHS hospital, by contrast, has no power to raise, say, the price of a cataract operation; it cannot close an
A&E department which is loss-making on the tariffs imposed on the hospitals; and if, say, it reduces staffing levels, it
can expect to be denounced by the Care Quality Commission, and perhaps have its senior management forced out
of their jobs. Can it raise the utilization of beds? The Nuffield Trust report that bed occupancy is running at 95 per
cent on average, a figure which would be the envy of the hotel trade, which in the UK achieves around 75 per cent.
Clinicians have argued that 85 per cent is the maximum safe level.
And in relation to the utilization of employees the PAC reported that in 2014 the service was short of 50,000 clinical
staff; the GMC report that a quarter of doctors below the rank of consultant are sleep-deprived; and the Royal
College of Physicians found 80 per cent of trainee medics suffering, at times, “excessive stress”. These data do not
suggest there is a great deal of slack in the system.
Management of information by the funder has been central to both the bank and the hospital arrangements. In the
banking case, once the borrower was classified as at risk, a review of the borrower was often commissioned from an
outside organization. This was completed at the expense of the borrower, but the information in the review was
withheld from the borrower. The borrower was also forbidden access to its regular relationship manager, denied the
information-sharing that access had previously allowed. And information on the value of its assets was “managed”:
according to Tomlinson, the value of assets in its balance sheet was revised downwards by valuers who were
appointed by the bank and depended for their continuing income on the bank – raising the probability of balance
sheet insolvency.
In the hospital case, the information from the Prime Minister was that “the Government has not just given him
[Simon Stevens, Head of NHS England] £8billion extra, we’ve given him £10billion extra”, to which the Chair of the
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Commons Health Committee responded “the claim does not stand up to scrutiny”, and it was “not only incorrect but
risks giving the false impression that the NHS is awash with cash”; it was denied too by the Head of NHS England
himself.
The Health Secretary then maintained that “in 2016-17 the NHS will receive the sixth biggest increase in history”,
whereas the independent King’s Fund and the Health Foundation explained that, properly measured, it went down
to 28th  place in the ranking since 1975-6. After a wide-ranging review of the hard information, the NAO recently
concluded that the “financial problems are endemic and this is not sustainable”.
Still, the misinformation seems to prevail in the public mind. In a survey reported recently by the Financial Times
(31.12.16), the general public in the UK typically believed that the country spent towards 20 per cent of GDP on
health. This is more than twice the actual share. On this measure, the King’s Fund rank the UK as 13th of 15
similarly prosperous countries – the original EU15. The UK share has fallen in recent years, and, on current
government plans, the Office for Budget Responsibility project that it will continue to fall in the next few years.
Before the cuts of recent years, the NHS was meeting most of its performance targets and achieving high approval
ratings from the public – in 2010, 70 per cent were very or quite satisfied with the way the service was run, the
highest on record – while spending on health as a share of GDP was only half the corresponding share expended
by the US. It has been argued that US health outcomes were on average no better than those of the much more
parsimonious UK.
Returning to Tomlinson, why would a bank “artificially distress an otherwise viable business”? It is alleged that in the
case of RBS, for example, if the client borrower ended this process being broken up, with assets sold at bargain, fire
sale, prices, the buyer would frequently be RBS’s West Register subsidiary, which made a healthy profit when it sold
these assets on. RBS’s restructuring division, Global Restructuring Group (GRG), recorded profits of over a billion
pounds in 2011 – very welcome to RBS management when the Bank overall was in serious deficit. GRG has since
been closed down in the face of criticism; and a compensation fund established for clients who suffered detriment.
But why would a Health Secretary, charged with maintaining the health of the Health Department, adopt such a
seemingly perverse strategy? While I was searching for an explanation, a colleague pointed to the words in Mr
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